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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LA\\"'RENCE

~IIGLIACCIO,

Pla.intiff afYUl Appella;nt;
vs.

Case No.

FRANK DAYIS, SALLY DA YI:S, his

7412

wife, and JOHX B. DA YIS,

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL
FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Fred W. Keller, Judge
ST.&TEMENT OF FACTS
This is an Appeal by the plaintiff, the appellant,
from the judgment of the Seventh Judicial District
Court, setting in Emery County, Utah. The mining
claims involved have lengthy descriptions so we refer
this Court to the Answer of Respondents, (Judgment
Roll pages 40-46) for their detailed description. The
descriptions are of little significance from the view point
of this Appeal.
While the appellant brought this suit primarily to
quiet title to seven (7) mining claims, the Complaint
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contains three separate causes of action. One: To quiet
title; Two: Ownership; obtained by adverse possession
for over seven (7) years; and Three: An accounting for·~
damages for the commission of waste under our statute.
(Complaint-Judgment Roll pages 50-55). The action
was commenced on the 11th day of April, 1949, in Emery~~
County, by filing of the Complaint. (Judgment Roll page ~
50). A restraining order was issued and served upon all "
of the defendants. (Judgment Roll pages 47-48). The
case was tried without a jury. The defendant, John B.
Davis, defaulted.
J

In January, 1941, John B. Davis, J. L. Safley, A. C.~
Guymon (Trans. 59) and J. W. Jensen located seven~,,
(7) mining claims on the unsurveyed public domain in
Emery County, State of Utah. Safley and Guymon, at
different dates in 1941, quit-claimed their interests to
John B. Davis; J. W. Jensen quit-claimed his interest to
appellant in June, 1948. On the 27th of May, 1942,
(Trans. 41, 60, 61, 63, 64, 133) John B. Davis and wife
quit-claimed all their interests in and to the seven (7) ~
mining claims involved in this action to appellant for
$1,000.00, which quit-claim deed was forceably withheld

~

1
J

from appellant by J. B. Hammond (Trans. 44, 82) until ~
January 19, 1949, when it was recorded in Emery County.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 1). Appellant tried to obtain this deed
and finally did so on the date as aforesaid. Appellant
did not owe F. B. Hammond anything and there was no
reason for withholding it from appellant, and when
appellant and John B. Davis called for it, Hammond~
1
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refused to surrender, clahning that he had some sort of
deal, to which deal appellant was not a party, although
Hammond tried to make appellant a party. Delivery had
been made to appellant on or about the 27th of May,
1942, but he left his said deed with Hammond. The appellant took possesion of the mining claims in 1942 and
from then until the present time, has had continuous and
actual possession of all of these claims. (Trans. 134 to
136).
For over six years after 1942, there was very little
mining done on these claims, except exploration work by
appellant which was sufficient to hold possession. (Trans.
134). In 1946, appellant learned that the Federal Government was seeking Uranium bearing ores, and he be.came active and by May of 1948, was prepared to mine
ores from these claims. (Trans. 136). In the latter part
of May, 1948, Frank M. Davis came to the home of appellant, primarily to find out if appellant still owned these
claims. He was told by the appellant that he, Lawrence
Migliaccio, owned all the claims, as it was at about this
time that appellant secured the remaining, outstanding
interest from J. W. Jensen and wife. (Trans. 136-138).
The appellant and Frank Davis, before the end of
June, 1948, had entered into an oral agreement, called
a "working agreement." (Trans. 136-138). By June
28th, the claims had been restaked and in early July,
appellant and Frank Davis were working the claims and
selling the ores in Monticello, Utah. Appellant did the
:. hauling and Frank did the mining on the basis of a 50-50
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sharing of the profits from the sale of ores. (Trans.
138). Mining under this agreement continued for a few
months, until October 1948.
Trouble developed between appellant and Frank
Davis and another oral agreement was entered into
in October, 1948 whereby appellant agreed to haul ore
from the" old dump" that had been there since appellant
stopped active mining in the latter part of July, 1942,
and to allow Frank and some employees to mine and
haul the new mined ore, but they were still to share
profits, share and share alike. (Trans. 141). This continued until the 11th of January, 1949, when a serious
quarrel took place which resulted in this law suit. (Trans.
141 to 146).
Meanwhile, in October, 1948, John B. Davis had appeared at his brother, Frank's, solicitation, and began
working on the claims with Frank, splitting Frank's profits 50-50. (Trans. 72-73). Before John B. Davis started
to work with his brother, Frank, he came to Price in
August from his home in Hood River, Oregon. On the
1
9th of August, 1948, appellant, John B. Davis, and Frank
Davis drove to Castle Dale for the purpose of searching
the records of the County Recorder's office for informa- ~
tion for Attorney Raymond Senior about what is known
as the ''Gibbon Case.'' John B. Davis was a defendant in this case. At this time, John B. Davis executed
a quit~claim deed (Exhibit "C ") of a ONE-HALF UN-j
DIVIDED INTEREST in the claims which the Record- j
er's Records then (August 9, 1948) showed he owned
1
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of record a THREE-QUARTERS INTEREST. John B.
Davis had deeded to appellant all his interest in 1942,
(Exhibit I) but this deed had not then been placed of
record. This deed of ~\.ugust 9, 1948 was recorded on
the same day. (Trans. 77).
J!ining was carried on under the first and second
oral agreements from July, 1948, up to and including
April 13, 1949, at which time, Frank M. Davis was restrained from working on the claims. Frank M. Davis
operated these claims (alone with his employees) and
sold ore therefrom from January 11, 1949 up to and
including April13, 1949.
The appellant relies upon the following errors committed by the Court for reversal of the Judgment and
such other ruling as to the Court seems equitable.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED BY HIS SILENCE AND THAT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF
JOHN B. DAVTS TO THE RESPONDENT,
FRANK DAVIS, DATED AUGUST 9, 1948, WAS
VALID. (RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT "C").

2.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS, FRANK M.
DAVIS AND SALLY DAVIS, WERE AND ARE
TENANTS IN COMMON, APPELLANT OWNING
A % UNDIVIDED INTERES:T AND RESPON-
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DENTS OWNING A 3j8 UNDIVIDED INTEREST
IN THESE MINING CLAIMS. (JUDGMENT
PAGES 3 AND 4; JUDGMENT ROLL PAGES
19 AND 22).
3.

THE COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE INJUNCTION AND ORDERING THE CLERK TO
DELIVER APPELLANT'S BOND TO THERESPONDENTS, FRANK M. DAVIS AND SALLY
DAVIS. (JUDGMENT PAGE 4; JUDGMENT
ROLL, PAGES 19AND 22).

4.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT COULD NOT SET-OFF ALL THE
ORE SALES OF THE RESPONDENT, FRANK
M. DAVIS, BEYOND THE APPELLANT'S ORE
SALE:S IF A SUIT ON THE UNDERTAKING
FOR AN INJUNCTION, OR RESTRAINING ORDER, WAS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS, ~
FRANK AND SALLY DAVIS, AGAINST APPELLANT. (FINDINGS OF FACT PAGE 5; !•
JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE 27).
.

5.

THE COURT ERRED IN OVER-RULING THE J
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
(JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE 12).
·~

6.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE
RESPONDENT, FRANK M. DAVIS TO AC- ~
COUNT FOR HIS ORE SALES DURING THE
~
OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY BEFORE 1
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1

7

THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS ISSUED
AXD SERVED UNDER THE LOWER COURT'S

DECREE THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON. (JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE
19-22).
7.

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DETERMINE THE RESPECTIVE INTERESTS
OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS IN THE
~IINING EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS AND EMPLOYED IN THEIR MINING OPERATIONS OF
THESE CLAIMS.
ARGUMENT I.

The Argument upon which the division of the brief
is based deals with the Assignments of Error Numbers
1 to 5 inclusive.
1.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED BY HIS SILENCE AND THAT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF
JOHN B. DAVIS TO THE RESPONDENT,
FRANK DAVIS, DATED AUGUST 9, 1948, WAS
VALID. (RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT "C.").

2.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS, FRANK
DAVIS AND SALLY DAVIS, WERE AND ARE
TENANTS IN COMMON, APPELLANT OWNING
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A FIVE-EIGHTHS UNDIVIDED INTEREST
AND RESPONDENTS OWNING A THREEEIGHTHS UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THESE
MINING CLAIMS.
3.

THE COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE INJUNCTION AND ORDERING THE CLERK TO
DELIVER APPELLANT'S BOND TO THERESPONDENTS, FRANK DAVIS AND !SALLY
DAVIS.

4.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT COULD NOT SET-OFF ALL THE
ORE SALES OF THE RESPONDENT, FRANK
DAVIS, BEYOND THE APPELLANT'S ORE
SALES IF A SUIT ON THE UNDERTAKING
FOR AN INJUNCTION, OR RESTRAINING ORDER, WAS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS,
FRANK AND SALLY DAVIS, AGAINST APPELLANT.

5.

THE COURT ERRED IN OVER-RULING THE
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Unfortunately, the Finding.s of Fact do not have
their paragraphs numbered. We, therefore, quote the
Finding important to our argument at this point, from
page 4 of the Finding of Fact. It reads:
.I
''That defendant, Frank Davis, had heard of
the existence of a deed from J. B. Davis to plaintiff, but on the other hand, the plaintiff know-
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ingly permitted the said Frank Davis to believe
that he was acquiring one-half of the three-fourths
interest of the said J. B. Davis, and participated
in the transaction whirh resulted in the execution
and delivery of the said deed of August 9th, 1948,
and knowingly pern1itted said Frank Davis to
perform labor and expend money relying thereon." (Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Judgment Roll P. 23-28).
From this finding, the Judgment and Decree decided that the appellant was estopped by his silence and
the quit-claim deed from John B. Davis to Frank M.
Davis was valid. (Judgment and Decree page 4, Judgment roll, page 22).
STATEMENT
.As the plaintiff, the appellant, understands this case,
the matter that governs most of the errors assigned,
hinges on whether the record establishes an estoppel
against the appellant. The Assignments of Error, 2 to
5, will be determined as error or not error, depending
upon what the court holds in respect to the Assignment
of Error No. 1, so Assignments of Error 2 to 5 will
be included in the Argument of Error No. 1. That this
Court may have the evidence conveniently before it,
such portion of the transcript as appellant thinks controls the question of Estoppel and the facts upon which
this Findings and Judgment are grounded is presented
substantially below:
In the testimony that follows, Appellant has attempted to cover the evidence that definitely relates to
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the title ''Actual Notice.'' The respondents received a
quit-claim deed from John B. Davis and wife several
years before the quit-claim deed of John B. Davis to
F·rank M. Davis, dated August 9, 1948. This evidence is
so closely tied into the evidence relating to Estoppel that
to state all of it separately under each heading would
so lengthen this Brief that it may be objectionable to
the Court. All the testimony quoted herein applies to
the Arguments presented under the separate headings.
(a) TESTIMONY FROM THE INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS.
Taken on May 16, 1949.
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DOROTHY HEINER
BY MR. RUGGERI:
Q.

Now, I will ask you whether or not you ever
had a conversation with Frank M. Davis relative to the deed that you and John B. Davis
signed over to Lawrence Migliaccio~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When did you have the first conversation, the
first of such conversation or conversationsY

A.

Well, it was just before they went to work
out to the mountain, wherever that was.
(Inj. Proc. 16)

Q.

It was before they went to work on the mountain~

A.

Yes, sir. . . .

Q.

Now will you relate what was said at this
time relative to the deed?
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A.

:Jir. Davis just told me that nf r. Migliaccio
had the deed to the mines and he asked me if
I had signed them and I told him at the time
I didn't remember signing them and he said
that nir. :Migliaccio had my signature on
them, so after I seen my signature, I recognized it.
(Inj. Proc. 17)
(Plaintiff puts in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
without objection (Transcript page 22-23)
for which plaintiff paid John B. Davis $1,000)

DIRECT EXA~IINATION OF LAWRENCE MIGLIACCIO BY ~IR. RUGGERI:

Q. All right, Mr. Migliaccio, I will ask you
whether or not you ever had a conversation
with, or conversations with Frank Davis relative to your deed from John B. Davis~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Now when did you have the first of such conversations~

A. At my home.

Q. And when was
A.

Around the latter part of May or first of
June, somewhere in there.

Q. What
A.

it~

year~

1948.

Q. And who was present at this
A.

conversation~

My wife.

Q. Who else~ List all the parties that were
there, if anyone else.
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A.

I think Mrs. Sally Davis was there too.

Q.

And Frank M. Davis and yourself, is that
right~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now what was said at this time relative to
your deed from John B. Davis to the vanadium claims lto 7 inclusive~

A.

He said, "Let's get- -"

Q.

Who do you mean by ''he''~ Let's use names.

A.

Frank Davis said to me, he said, "Let's get
John down here,'' and I said, "What for-"
He said, ''I want to get my share of that
property.'' And I said, ''I have got the deed
for the property ,we don't need him in any
way. If I want to give anything, that is up to
me.''

Q.

And what did Frank Davis say, if anything?

A.

He said, "Oh, it's a forgery."
(Inj. Proc. 34 and 35)

Q.

Now, do you remember anything else being
said at that time, during this particular conversation~

A.

Well, he said, ''Can I come down and work
in down there~''

Q.

And what did you say to
conversation.

A.

I said, ''Yes, you can come down and work on
a working agreement of half the money."
And he said, ''If I can get in down there, I
would spend some money and there is plenty
of ore down there, we can make a lot of

him~

Give us the
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money.''
(Inj. Proc. 35)
(b)

EVIDENCE FROM THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT.

DIRECT EXAM. LAWRENCE MIGLIACCIO BY MR.
STEFFENSEN:

Q. 'yell, repeat it as near as you can.
A. Well, he came down to my house and he said,
''Lawrence, do you still own, or does my
brother own Temple Mountain~'' He said,
"It is getting hot," he said, "this uranium
deal,'' and I said, ''I know it,'' and he said
something about, he said does my brother
Jim own a part of that mountain and those
claims,'' and I said, ''No. I own it and I
have a quit-claim deed on it.''

Q. Now when you speak of Jim, who is

that~

A. Well, Frank called John, Jim. He meant
John Davis.

Q. He referred to John B.
A.

Davis~

Yes, that's right.

Q. And at that time he asked you the question,
did he~
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What else did he
A.

say~

Well, he said, ''What about me getting in
down there, putting some machinery in that
mine down there and getting things into operation.'' He said, ''You know,'' he said,
''there is enough ore down there for you and
I and many more.'' ''Yes, I think so,'' I
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said, "What about getting in with you."
"Well," I said, "I haven't got much money
right now to start mining operations.''
Q.

Did you enter into an oral or other agreement~

A.

Just an oral agreement.

Q.

And what was the basis of the agreement?

A.

Well, we figured, oh, he was to spend the
money until we got it going good and we'd
split fifty-fifty. Pay the expenses out after
the ore had been dug.

Q. What were you to furnish other than the property~

A.

Q.

1 wasn't supposed to furnish anything, but
I did.
What did you furnish~

A.

I furnished two old trucks.

Q.

Did you haul ore with them~

A.

Yes, ;sir.
(Trans. 136-138)

CROSS EXAM. OF MIGLIACCIO BY MR. MOYNIHAN:
Q.

Well you say that you told Frank in the
Spring of 1'948, you didn't have to, that you
didn't have to deal with John because you
already had title to the property1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you claim that the title ever since May
of 19421

A.

Yes, sir.
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(Trans. 155)
DffiECT EX~-\:JL OF nLilliE O'NEIL :MIGLIACCIO
BY :JIR. STEFFENSEN:
Q.

Q.

Are you acquainted with Frank Davis o?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. \\nen did you first meet him in relation to
anything happening about these claims~
A.

I would say it \Yas around the middle of June
he came to my home and had a discussion
with Lawrence on the front porch. I was
standing at the door because I was wondering
who he was and I listened to it and he said
to me, or said to Lawrence, "What about
the Temple Mountain property~" and he said,
"Are you still interested 1n it~" And Lawrence said, '' Y e.;;;.'' And he said, ''Well that
uranium deal is getting plenty hot, I would
like to have a chance to go down there.'' And
he says, ''What about my brother, John,
does he still have an interest~" And Lawrence said, ''No, he gave me his interest in
1942.''
(Trans. 169:-170)

A.

Yes. One night when they both came together, why she said to me, ''Frank tells me
that Lawrence told him that John had deeded
him all the property in 1942. '' So she said,
''I think that is the stupidest thing I ever
heard of, we know that John wouldn't give
the property to Mr. Migliaccio.''

THE COURT: Just a minute, was Mr. Davis
there~

A. Yes.
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THE COURT : When she said
A.

that~

Yes, she also stated, "We are going to get
that deed and send it to Washington, D.C.,
because we know that the signatures on it are
forged.''
·
(Trans. 171-172)

DIRECT EXAM. OF G. A. COOPER BY MR. RUGGERI:

Q.

Now, Mr. Cooper, I will ask you whether or
not you are acquainted with Frank M. Davis?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q. How long }lave you known Mr.

Davis~

A.

Off hand, I'd say about 5 or 6 years.

Q.

Now calling your attention to the month of
June, 1948, I will ask you whether or not you
had occasion to talk with Mr. Frank M.
Davis concerning the Vanadium King claims?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Where did this conversation transpire?

A.

At the Walnut Bar in Price.

Q.

Do you recall what day in June of 1948 that
was~

A.

No, I couldn't tell you but it was the early
part of June.

Q.

Now who was present besides you and Mr.
Davis, if anyone~

A.

Well, all the ones I can think of now is
Jim Hartzell.

Q.

Now will you relate the conversation that you
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and 1\Ir. Davis had relative to the
King claims 1

A.

\~anadium

\Yell, he mentioned to me that he was going
to send for his brother John. I told him no
need to send for John because John had no
claim there at all. And he said, ''Why~'' I
said, "'\Yhy Lawrence Migliaccio got a quitclaim deed to that.'' And he said, ''If he
has got a quit-claim deed to it, it has been
forged, the name has been forged.'' And I
said, ''I don't know anything about the names
being forged." But I said, "I seen the deed."
(Trans. 174-175)

REBUTTAL EXAM. OF COOPER BY STEFFENSEN:

Q.

This morning, Attorney Hammond, F. B., I
believe it is, testified that you were in his office but you never saw a deed. Do you now
.say that you saw a deed~

A.

I did.
(Trans. 315)

Q.

I show you the two exhibits and you pick
out the one that you saw.

A.

This one.

Q.

That is the one you saw~

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever seen that before~

MR. STEFFENSEN: The record will show that
is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
(Trans. 316)
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CROSS EXAM. OF COOPER BY MOYNIHAN:
Q.

How did you happen to see that deed?

A.

I was up there with Mr. Migliaccio in
mond's offices.
·

Q.

At what time?

A.

Oh, sometime previous to that, I wouldn't
set no date, but it was before that time.

Q.

You never saw the deed in Migliaccio's
session?

A.

Only there in the office.

Q.

It was in Mr. Hammond's office?

A.

That's right.

Ham~

pos~

Q. You didn't .see Migliaccio take it away with
him?
A.

No.
(Trans. 176)

DIRECT EXAM. OF LESTER TOMLINSON BY MR.
STEFFENSEN:

Q. Are you acquainted with Frank Davis¥
.A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How long have you known him?

A.

Well I have known him since 1924.

Q.

Do you recall any time in the spring of 1948
driving, of having a conversation pertaining
to these Vanadium King Mining claims with
Frank Davis?

A.

Well, yes. We talked about these claims quite
a number of times.
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Q.

"~ell

A.

"~ell

what wa8 .stated the first

time~

they was going down there and work
those claims at Ten1ple 1\Iountain.

Q. \Yell tell, go ahead. \Vas anything said about
who owned them 1
A.

\Yell, I knew the thing from the beginning.
I thought John Davis owned them when I
first heard about it and then the next thing
I knew about it, why Miglaccio gotten into
it somewhere, I don't know what the deal
"·as or anything. Only that Migliaccio had
a quit-claim deed from John.

Q. Had you ever seen it~
A.

I saw it one time, maybe a couple of times.

Q.

Where~

A. In Hammond's office.

Q. Now did you ever talk to Frank about that
deed~

A. Well, I probably did. I told him that I
thought Migliaccio had a quit-claim deed to
the property.

Q.

Said you thought~

A. Well, I told him I seen it.

Q.

That was in June, 1948 ~

A.

Well, it was either the later part of June
or sometime in July but it was more than
likely in July. I am quite sure that it was
probably after middle of July, 1948.

Q. And did you talk to him any other time about
the deed~
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A.

Well, just off and on as I seen him.

Q.

Before

A.

I am not sure, I was sure that I had seen
that deed in Hammond's office.

that~

THE COURT: You mean you told Mr. Davis,
Frank Davis that~
A.

Yeo, during our talks, we had been down to
Temple Mountain, I was kind of interested
down there myself and I was wondering how,
what kind of claim, whether he bought in
down there or how he owned an interest
down there and that is how it come up I told
him that I had seen this deed in Hammond's
office, made out to Migliaccio,

THE COURT : From John B.

Davis~

A. Yes.
(Trans. 182-183-184)
DIRECT EXAM. FRANK DAVIS BY MR. MOYNIHAN:

Q.

Now, Mr. Davis, tell us about this deed from
John Davis to Lawrence Milgliaccio dated
oometime in May, 1940. What conversation
did you have with Migliaccio about that deed?

THE COURT: May,

1942~

MR. MOYNIHAN: Yes, 1942, that is right, Your
Honor.
A.

I heard rumors of deeds but I never could
chase down any definite deed but after we
had the trouble-

Q. Well, now while you are talking about rumors,
did you hear the former wife of John Davis
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testify in this Court that you told her in
September or October that Migliaccio had a
deed to this property! Did you hear her
testimony on that!
A. I heard her testify, yes.
Q. Well, now what is the fact, what conve-rsation did you have with her and where was it
and what did ahe say?
A. I met her in the Skaggs store.
Q. At what place Y
A.

Or Safeway :S:tore in price and I asked her,
I said, "Dorothy, did you sign a quit-claim
deed that I heard that Migliaccio is supposed
to have Y'' and she told me she didn't sign
anything in Hammond's office but a divorce
paper.
(Trans. 257-258)

CROSS EXAM. OF FRANK DAVIS BY RUGGERI:

Q. Now, Mr. Davis, you say that all you have
heard is rumor that Lawrence had a deed, is
that right?
A.

That's all I ever heard. I never seen it.

Q. What do you mean by rumors~
A.

People talking about it, Lawrence mostly.

Q. What did Lawrence tell you about it?
A. Well, he told me many a time that, that he
was supposed to have one.
Q.

Supposed to have one what?

A.

Quit-claim deed from John Davis.
(Trans. 270)
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Appellant refers this Court to Plaintiff's Exhibit

"4."
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Did you tell her (Mrs. F. Davis) that on June
8, then to tell your brother John, that Migliaccio told you that he had turned all his
ahare over to him~
That was Migliaccio I understand told me.
Yes, he told me that he heard that.
So that in fact then, it wasn't December of
1948 that Migliaccio first told you he had a
deed, it was sometime prior to June 8, 1948
that he told you about the deed?
I mean a deed that he could swear by.
He talked with you about the deed before
June 8 didn't he1
He couldn't record it, he had no deed.
Well that is what you state here that he told
you?
(Trans. 272)

Q. And isn't it a fact that Mr. Migliaccio told
you that he had all the interest" fn this property prior to June 8, 1948?
A. No, sir.
_Q. Then how did you know, or rather why did
you state that he told you that in hia letter
to John?
A. State that again.
Q. Why did you tell John in this letter that he
had told you that?
A. Well, he claimed he had it. I heard he had
it, that's all.
(Trans. 273)
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REDIRECT EXA~L- FRANK DAVIS BY MOYNIHAN:
Q. In connection with conversation with Migliaccio about John B. Davis's deed, what, if
anything, did he ever say to you about his
ability to produce or whether he had recorded it1
A.

He couldn't produce it or record it.
(Trans. 293)

CROSS: EXAM. OF SALLY DAVIS BY RUGGERI:

Q.

Now when is the first time that you say according to your knowledge Frank had any
information that Lawrence had the deed to
the mining property~

A.

It was a rumor came in, I don't recall when
. it was. It was after Frank talked to John
in Oregon and it was in June and we were, he
had been to Lawrence's and John over the
telephone, Frank asked him if he still owned
his interest in Temple Mountain and he said
''absolutely.''

Q. When did he ask him that~
A. Well, I don't recall the date. He wouldn't
admit that but it was-

Q. Did you ever go with your husband, Frank
up to Attorney Hammond's office to f}nd
out for yourself whether or not there was
a deed there~
A. No. It wasn't recorded. Frank came to the
courthouse, he said it .should be on record. He
searched the books in the Rerocder's office,
he couldn't find it. He asked Lawrence about
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it, Lawrence said he knew about a deed.

Q.

That's right..

A.

That's all, he said he heard about it. But
he said he had never seen it.

Q.

Didn't he also say if he had the money he
would go get it1

A.

Yes.

Q. Didn'the tell you th~t was in Mr. Hammond's
office~

A.

No, sir, he didn't. He said, that's all that was
said.

Q. Didn't he say that the reason he couldn't
get it was because Mr. Hammond wouldn't
surrender it to him because he owed him some
money~

A.

No, sir. Why he couldn't get that record, he
said he knew about a deed, he had heard
about it, but he had never seen the deed and
that's all he knew about it.

Q. When did he tell you that~
A.

He kept on telling that up until August.

Q.

When did he tell you the first time?

A.

The first time was when we went in the house
one time and asked him about it.

Q.

What day was

that~

A. I couldn't tell the day, but it was sometime in
June, I do remember.
Q.

So that you first had information that he
claimed to own these claims, in June didn't
youf
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A.

He claimed, yes, but he never produced it.
(Trans. 309-10-11)

Q.

\Yell he told you he knew about the deed and
had the deed didn't he T

A.

He said one time that he had heard about
the deed himself.

Q. And when wa.s that T
A.

But that he didn't own the deed and that he
didn't have that deed.

Q. When was the one timeT
A.

That was sometime in June.

Q.

That was before you wrote this letter?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. I hand you what has been marked Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4 and ask you to examine that. I will
ask you whether or not you have seen this
before?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you first see itT
A.

I wrote it.

Q. Where did you write itT When T
A.

I imagine on June 18, 1948. (See Ex. 4)

Q. Who.se name did you sign to itT
A.

Frank's

Q. Well, was Frank there when you wrote this
letter'
A. I believ<e Frank was.
Q. Did he tell you what to put in it?
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A. Oh, he told me, but I put it in my own style.
Q. Did you write paragrph 3 in your own style?
A. Yes.
Q.

(Trans 311-312)
He said he could, he new wher·e to get it
(deed) didn't he~

A.

Yes, but he never offered to get it.

Did you ask him to get it for you~
No, sir.
Q. Why didn't you ask him~

Q.
A.

A.

Because it wasn't my business.

Q.

You weren't interested in that property?

A.

Yes, I was interested in that property but he
didn't hav·e it recorded in the proper place
to find it.
(Trans. 313)

Q.

Isn't it a fact that both you and Mr. Davis
knew that there was an existing deed?

A.

We heard rumors that there was an existing
deed.
What did you do to run those rumors down?

Q.
A.

We asked John. We asked Mr. and Mrs. Migliaccio and we went to the courthouse and it
wasn't recorded. What more do you want?

Q.

Did you go and see Mr. Hammond to see
whether or not he had the deed~

A.

Well, I thought if Mr. Migliaccio had such
a thing, he'd certainly go and get it and have
it recorded.
(Trans. 313-314)
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~\HGU~IENT

AND LAW

THE RESPONDENTS RECEIVED NOTHING
BY THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM JOHN B.
DAYIS DATED ~\UGUST 7,1948 FOR THE RESPONDENTS HAD ACTU~\L NOTICE OF THE EXISTE~CE OF THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF JOHN B.
DA YIS OF ~IA Y 27, 19±2, TO APPELLANT BEFORE
AUGUST 9th 1949.
I. ACTUAL NOTICE - The Law.
Our Utah Code, Ann. Vol. 4, Title 78-1-·6, reads:
''Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement
to convey any real estate or whereby any real
estate may be affected to operate as notice to
third person.s shall he proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed by this
title and recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which such real estate is situated,
but shall be ·calicl and binding between the part~es
thereto without such proof, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons
who have had actual notice. ''
''Where purchasers of real estate had .such
notice of adverse claims of plaintiffs as would put
reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain what
interest was, they took subject to any equities or
interest that plaintiffs had in premi.ses, though
such interest was not :recorded as required by
this section. ' '
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 U. 236, 177 P. 763.
''The demands of this section are answered
if a party dealing with the land has information
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,of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man
upon inquiry, and which would, if pursued, lead
to actual knowledge of the state of the title; and
this is actu~l notice.''
ToZwnd v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 24 P. 190, Aff'd 154 U.S.
499, 38 L. Ed. 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144.

''Under thJis sectiJon actual possession 0/IU],. occupwncy .amownts to· ''·actual notice'' to all the
world of grwntee's .rights, though his deed is no·t
recorded.''
Neponset Lwnd & Live Stock Co., v. Dixon, 10 U. 334,
37 P. 573, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, S 2611, which is
·substantially similar to present action.
''.Actual occupancy is enough to put parties
dealing with the premises up:on ilnquiry. ''
To·land v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 24 P. 190, Aff's 154 U.iS..
499, 38 L. Ed. 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144.
''To entitle one to protection as a bona fide
purchas·er as against an unrecorded deed, his purchase must have been made without notice, actual
or constructive of the unreeorded deed.''
San Petro, etc. Co. v. U. 8. 146 U.S. 120, 35 L. Ed.
912.
46 C. J. 53'9, ''A notice is r'egarded in law as
actual, when the party sought to be affected by it
knows of the existence of a particular fact in
question, or is conscious of having the means of
knowing it.''

Parker v. Mast.ers, 85 Kan. 130, 116 Pac. 22.7.
Rho des v. Outoalk 48 Mo. 367.
1

'' N otiee is actual when it is directly and per-
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sonally given to the party to be notified.''
46 C. J. 433. ''It is the general rule that whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts in judgment of the law to notice, provided the inquiry
becomes a duty, and would lead to a knowledge
of the facts by the exercise of ordinary intelligence and understanding.''

Woo·d v. Carpenter 101 U.S. 135, 25 L. Ed. 807.
Essex Nat. Bank v. Hurley 66 Fed. 2d. 552.
46 C. J. at pg. 544, "Wherever facts put a
party on inquiry, notice will be imputed to him, if
he resignedly abstains from making inquiry for
the purpose of avoiding notice.'' (and cases there
cited.)
20 R. C. L. pages 346-47, "What·ever fairly
puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice, where
the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he
omits to inquire; he is then chargeable with all
facts which, . by proper inquiry, he might have
ascertained. . . Notice of facts which would lead
an ordinary prudent man to make an exami~ation
which, if made, would disclose the existence of
other facts is sufficient notice of such facts.''
(and cases cited in note 11).
''A person has no right to shut his eyes
and/ or his ears to avoid information, and then
say that he had no notice.''

Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Do11arn, 142 U.S. 417,
38 L. Ed. 1063.
"It will not do to remain wilfully ignorant
of the thing really ascertainable. ''

McQuadl;y v. Waren 20 Wall, 14, 22 L. Ed. 311.
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LeVine v. Whitehouse 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2.
The facts that are involved by the foregoing law
consist of (a) respondents coming to appellant's home,
1naking inquiry as to who owned the mining claims.
Respondents were definitely informed that appellant
owned all of them. Transcript quotes are given in the
evidence above and in Exhibit 4. (b) Respondent,
Frank Davis, entered into an oral agreement, whereby
he was to furnish machinery and other mining equipnTent, and share the profits, share and share alike. (Transcript pages 128, 138, 276, 277, 165.) (c) Appellant
furnished the trucks and hauled the ore to Monticello
where it was sold. (Transcript pages 136-139.) (d) The
latter modifications of the first oral agreement are stated
in the Transcript pages, 103, 128, 242, 244. (e) The
actual sharing of the profits, after the deed of August
9, 1948, is revealed by the Transcript pages 243-44, 274,
276-277. All operations on these claims was done under
the agreements between appellant and Frank M. Davis
and the agreement between the. two Davis brothers, from
October 30 to the time when Frank M. Davis left the
property on April 13, 1949. (Transcript page 146.)
Frank Davis continued to operate under the second
oral agreement until the filing of the suit, and had never
indicated to appellant that he claimed any title to the
claims until his Answer was filed in the lower court.
From the evidence pr·esented, it is clear that the
respondents had the actual notice which our statute requires. There existed such a relation, by telephone, by
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correspondence and by conversation, between the
brothers, John B. and Frank l\1. Davis, that it seems
impossible to believe anything but that John B. Davis
had informed his brother, Frank, that he had quit-claimed all of his interest in the involved mining claims to
appellant. In Exhibit 4, the respondents state that they
had been informed by appellant of the existence of Exhibit 1. This, in itself, is sufficient actual notice to fulfill
the requirements of the statute as is revealed in the
cases above pre.sented and those followng.
(a) ACTUAL NOTICE OR MEANS OF NOTICE
''There is no estoppel when the other party
had notice of the facts ; to have the benefit of an
estoppel, a person must show good faith and
diligence to learn the truth.''

Hirning v.

Fede~al

Res,e.rve Bamk, 52 F. 2d, 383.

Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gisum, 84 N. H. 1, 146 A. 511,
64 A. L. R. 1116.
S & E Motor Corp. v. New York Indemnity Co.,
255 N.Y. 69, 174 N. E. 65.
When the facts are weighed, they clearly reveal
by the letter, Exhibit "4 ", a request by Frank M. Davis
for informetion from John B. Davis, about where the
title to the.se claims stood. In this Exhibit, respondent
states that they have been informed of such a deed as
Exhibit 1. Then on the several occaslons when John
B. Davis was with his brother, Frank, after this letter
was written, it is quite unreasonable to believe that if

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
John B. Davis didn't write to Frank and thereby inform him, he most certainly did tell Frank in one or
more of John's visits to Price, before August 9, 1948,
as well as on that date, of his deed to appellant. It
would be extremely unnatural for respondents to write
to John B. Davis and ask about a deed and then not
find out about it definitely when he, John B. Davis, came
to see them and work with them.
Should it be found that John didn't inform Frank
of John's quit-claim deed to appellant, then certainly,
it was the duty of Frank from the ''rumors'' he heard
of such a deed, to have ascertained what the true fact
was. Frank Davis spent a large part of his time in
Pri,ce where F. B. Hammond's office is located. It would
have taken but a few minutes for Frank to have learned
the truth about the deed he had been told so many times
about by four of the witnesses quoted above. It would
appear, that he was extremely negligent for not having
done so. For this negligence, this court must hold that
the appellant is not estopped and that appellant really
owns all the claims subject to the ownership of the United
States of the fee.
(b) POSSESSION CONSTITUTES ACTUAL NOTICE
''Under this section a deed as between the
parties and those having notice thereof is good
without- any aclmowledgement. And act'l«Jl, possession constitutes notioe. ''

Jordan v. Ut.ah R. Co., 47 U. 519, 522, 156 P. 939,
applying Comp. Laws 1907, S. 975, which is identical
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with present section 78-3-2, P. 507. (Notes)
· •Ordinarily a conveyance of land is valid
between the parties, and as to all parties having
acf1wl nohce thereof, without b·eing .recorded."

Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Oo., 5 Ut. 205, 210, 14 P. 338.
.. It is a general rule that whatever puts a
party on inquiry amounts in judgment of law to
be notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty,
and would lead to knowledge of the facts by the
exercise of ordinary intelligence and understanding.''

Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 Pac. 426.
In 46 C. J. pg. 534 S. 2, it states: ·
''A notice is regarded in law or action when
the party sought to be affected by its knows of
the existence of the particular fact in question,
or is conscious of having the means of knowing
it.... Notice is actual when it is directly or personally given to the party to be notified.''
''Actual notice need not be directly proved.
Like any other fact, it may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, sec.
272, p. 260, sees. 335, 336, pp. 312, 313; 31 C. J. S.,
Evidence, S. 178, p. 880; 46 C. J. S., Notice, .sec.
110, p. 568; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdprudence,
5th Ed., Sees. 595, 596, pp. 611-619."

People v. Juehling, 10 Cal. App. 2d 527, 531, 52 P.

520.
Schleif v. Grigsby, 88 Cal. App. 174, 180, 181, 263 P.
1

255.
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Hawke v. California Re,aUy, etc. Co., 28 Cal. App.
377, 382, 152 P. 959.
Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 2d 193, 200, 180 P. 2d 873,
171 A. L. R. 667.
Under Section 78-1-6, Utah Code Ann., it states:
''A deed as between the parties and those
having notice thereof is good and actual possession constitutes notice.''

Jordan v. Utah R. Co., 47 Utah 519, 156 Pac. 939.
Gaffmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 226, 177 Pac. 763.
The appellant was in possession of these mining
claims in June, 1948, and had been in possession of them
since June, 1942. (Tr. 134) Frank Davis came to appellant and entered into an oral working agreement on the
basis of a 50-50 share in the profits from the sale of ores
shipped and sold from these claims. Why did he come
to appellant if he didn't know of his brother's, John B.
Davis, deed to appella~t, as the deed from J. W. Jensen
had not as yet been executed or received. (Exhibit 3)
The court will recall the testimony of Sally Davis, where
she states that after Frank had telephoned his brother,
John, they called upon appellant at his house. (Tr. 305)
The J. W. Jensen deed, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, was not
received until late in June, 1948.
Why did Frank M. Davis and Sally Davis come to
see appellant at his home, after telephoning brother John,
if John had not informed them of his (John's) deed to
appellant over the phone~ The evidence quoted above
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tells us that no other deed was in existenc.e except ExhiYit 1, prior to this ti1ne, which time was early in June,
1948.
(c.) SOl\fE TITLE :JIUST BE IN GRANTOR OR
HE CONVEYS NOTHING BY HIS DEED
In 18 C. J., p. 159, 160,

\Ye

find:

'·There should be some title or interest, in
law or equity, in the grantor to enable him to
convey, and, except under a power of appointment
.so to do, a grantor can convey no greater estate
than he has or in whic.h he has an alienable title
or interest. It follows that a deed from a person
without title, or interest whic.h he may convey,
is in operative as a c.onveyance, and the grantees,
undr a release and quit-claim, will take nothing
where the grantor has no interest which he can
convey. So a ded is inoperative where the grantor
has previously conveyed his entime title.
From the foregoing evidence, the law cited, and
more to be presented hereafter, we now present further
argument as to estoppel. We look first at our statutes,
keeping in mind that there was a quit-c.laim deed from
John B. Davis and wife to appellant of all his interest
in these seven (7) mining claim.s, but that said deed had
not been rec.orded at the time John B. Davis exe,cuted
a deed of AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF of his claimed
of rec.ord THREE-QUARTERS INTEREST to his
brother, Frank. Frank had been told about this deed of
' John's to appellant several times prior to John B. Davis'
quit-claim deed to his brother, Frank Davis of August
9, 1948. Frank Davis had been put upon notic.e of the
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existence of this deed which notice he admits in his and
his wife's letter to John B. Davis (Exhibit 4).
II. ESTOPPEL
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ESTOPPED
BY THIS SILENCE OR OTHER.WISE
The lower court, it appears, based its Finding and
Judgment upon the idea that the appellant was estopped
by his silence on two occasions and that because of such
.silence, the validity of the quit-claim deed of August 9,
1948, of John B. Davis to his brother Frank M. Davis,
was upheld. The testimony upon which the court held is
on the following evidence.
The parties, except Sally Davis, are in the Courthouse in Castle Dale, when the following evidence is
given:
CROSS EXAMINATION OF J. B. DAVIS BY
l\iOYNIHAN:

'' Q.

And in the presence of Lawrence Migliaccio
and Frank Davis and the county attorney, ¥r.
Jewkes, didn't you say Iwant a deed, in
substance, I want a deed for part of these
Vanadium King Claims to Frank~ Would
you have time to draw up the deed~

A.

No, I did not. N'ot in front of Lawrence Migliaccio at all....

Q.

And didn't Mr. Jewkes tell you that he had
time and if you'd come up to his office, he'd
make out the deed~

A.

Yes, he said he had time to make out the
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deed, but we didn't do it in front of Lawrence
:Migliaccio. (Tr. 99-100)

Q. And after, isn't it a fact that you stated to
Jewkes on the 9th day of Au_gust in the Clerk
and Recorder's office, Castle Dale, Emery
County Courthouse, Emery County, Utah,
in substance and effort, 'Can you make out
a deed from me to Frank for some of these
claim8~'

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Migliaccio was there~
A. ~Iiglia,ccio wasn't there. He was in the courthouse, but he wasn't in the presence of where
I asked that.

Q. But you then came upstairs with the County
Attorney~

A.

That was, that que8tion you asked me before
was asked in Mr. Jewkes' office. (Tr. 100)

Q. And you had a conversation though, did yo:u
not, in the Recorder's office wherein you requested Jewkes, while Migliaccio was in the
Recorder's office, if he could make some
papers out for the8e claims to Frank~
A.

No, sir.

Q. You didn't say anything to him about making
out a deed down there~
A.

No, sir, not in front of Migliaccio, I didn't.
We asked him up in his room.

Q. Well, did you make it down there, not in front
of Migliaccio, did you have any ~onversation
about it down there~
A. Not that I remember about, no.
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Q.

Were you watching Migliaccio every minute 1

A.

No, but he was in the Recorder's office and
there was nothing said about them papers
until we got up in Jewkes' room.

Q.

Was there any reason why you didn't want
Migliaccio to hear what you were ·.saying that
day~

A.

Yes, I didn't want him to know that I was
doing that.

Q. You came together.
A.

I know it. But he didn't know we was going
to do that though. (Tr. 101-102)

Q. After you and Migliaccio and Frank talked
in June and July, wasn't the agreement that
each of you were to have a third interest if
Frank would go ahead and develop the claim'
A. In what ore we got.
Q. Isn't that the reason you filed the affidavit
that I have heretofore questioned you about?
A. For what ore was dug, yes. (Tr. 105)
Q.

Wasn't the consideration for the deed made
by you to Frank on the 9th day of August
based upon his demand for ~wme interest in
the claims before he advanced money for
their operation and development¥

A.

Well, he wanted some protection and I figured be:cause Migliaccio hadn't recorded the
one I gave him that I done that and I gave
Frank that on." (Tr. 106)

REBUTTAL-J. B. DAVIS BY STEFFENSEN:

'' Q.

Did you hear the-were you here in this build-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

ing before the Clerk's office on the 9th of
~'-ngnst and did you hear what Frank said
about yon~
A.

Yes.

Q.

"\Vere you three

A.

Yes.

here~

Q. "\Vas anything said in Lawrence's presence
about the deed that wa8 made by Jewkes
that day1
A.

Ko, sir.

Q.

Are you sure about that 1

A.

Yes, sir, absolutely.

Q. "\Vas anything said about that deed in Lawrence's presence so he could hear it1
A.

No, sir.

Q.

When that deed was made by Jewkes and
taken down to the County Recorder's office,
who took it there 1

A.

I did.

Q. Was Lawrence there 1
A.

He wa8 out in the hall.

Q. Did you see you with the deed 1
A.

No.

Q.

And you had it recorded that day1

A.

Yes, sir. ( Tr. 318-319)

Q. Did you tell your brother before you gave
him that deed of August 9th that Lawrence
owned that property 1
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A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did he ask you~

A.

Well, he hinted around about it but I never
did deny that Lawrence had a deed.

Q. You never denied it but you say you never
told .him about it~
A.

No." (Tr. 321)

REBUTTAL-J. B. DAVIS BY MOYNIHAN:

'' Q.

You could have gone up with Lawrence Migliaccio to Hammond's office and got that deed
and recorded it before the 1st of July when
you 1came back here and avoided all that
trouble if you knew~

A.

I do not. I definitely could not because Hammond refused to let us have the deed." (Tr.
323)

DIRECT-FRANK DAVIS BY MOYNIHAN:

"Q. Was anything said to Mr.
A. Yes.
Q. What did you say to

Jewkes~

him~

A.

Well-

Q.

In the presence of

A.

Well, I called him over and asked him if
he could or would make a quit-claim deed
from John to me.

Q'.

How far was Migliaccio from you when you
made that request~

A.

Well, he was just, we was just there all together.

Migliaccio~
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Q. Yon called him from where he was and he
came over to where you three
A.

were~

Yes.

Q. "\Yhat did you do after yo'u asked him that
question Y What wa8 his reply1
A.

He'd do it.

Q. And where did you go 1
~\.

To his office. (Tr. 247-248)

THE COURT: Did you ever, now listen carefully,
did you ever have any conversation with
John (Lawrence) :Jliglia~cio about your getting an interest in the ownership of the claims
in this case 1
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Where did you have such a conversation 1
A.

At Senior's office.

THE COURT: Who wa8 present1
A.

John, Lawrence, and Raymond Senior.

THE COURT: Just to shorten the matter, was
that at the time that has been referred to in
the evidence here when a certain paper was
drawn1
A.

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now state as nearly as you can
what was said and who said it at that time.
Now, bear in mind the question is, what was
said upon the subject of your getting an interest in the mines, the claims.
A.

John told Raymond Senior that he would
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give me one-half of his interest.
THE COURT: And what did Migliaccio, was
:Migliaccio there when that was said~
A. Yes.
THE COURT: What did he say, if anything to
that~

A.

He said nothing.

Q. At the time on the 28th of June, 1948, can
you re;call that as the date when Frank and
you were in that office~ (Se~ior's office)
A.

Yes.

Q. Was Lawrence

there~

A.

I don't believe he was.

Q.

On the

A.

No, sir. (Tr. 317)

28th~

Q. Did you hear Mr. Sutch or whatever his
name is, I don't remember the name.
THE COURT: Oliver Sutch.
A.

No, I don't believe I did.

Q.

Were you there when Oliver was there~ (In
Senior's office)

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that the time Lawrence was there~

A.

No, sir, he was not there at that time.

Q.

He wasn't there at that

A.

No, sir." (Tr. 317-18)

time~

It is very evidence that Lawrence, the appellant,
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never had heard John B. Davis claim that he owned 3A,
of these seven mining clain1a. This testimony of John
B. Davis is corroborated by Exhibit 3, as its recording
date is June 28, El-1-8, by Lawrence niigliaccio. This
definitely establishes that appellant was not in the offices
of Senior on the 28th of June-just as thh; witness states.
''THE COURT: Did you ever, at any time have
any conversation in the presence of Migliaccio on the subject of your getting an interest
in the claims~
A.

John and I -

THE COURT: Just a minute, did you ever at
any other time~
A.

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Where were

you~

A. We were here in this courthouse.
THE COURT: Who was
A.

present~

John, Lawrence and myself.

THE COURT: Were in this courthou5e ~
A.

Out by this Clerk's office.

THE COURT: You and John and Lawrence, is
that correct~
A. Yes.
THE COURT: What was that date~
A. August 9th.
THE COURT: 1948~
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What was said~
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A.

We decided-

THE COURT: No. What was said? What do
you recall? Now don't say you decided becau.se that is a conclusion. What did you
say and what is your best recollection of
what was said by you or anyone else there
on the subject of your getting ownership in
this property?
A.

We talked this over and decided-

THE COURT: No, what was said?
A.

Well, I don't understand you.

THE COURT: Well, what did Lawrence Migliaccio say at that converen;ce?
A.

He was ju.st there listening. John was putting
up the talk.

THE COURT: What did John say?
A.

He said, 'I will go and we will have you a
deed made out.'

THE COURT: Where was Migiaccio when he
said that?
A.

He was with us.

THE COURT: What did he say, if
A.

anything~

Nothing.

THE COURT: What did you say?
A.

Well, I said, 'We will see Mr. Jewkes.'

THE COURT: W er·e there any other times when
you discus.sed that in the presence of Mr.
Migliaccio? Discussed your getting an interest in the claims?
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~-\.

I couldn't say.·' ( Tr. 263-264-265-266)

CROSS
RUGGERI:

EX~\:JIIX~\TION

OF FRANK DAVIS BY

"'Q. But did you tak about that deed in the
A.

car~

\Yell I couldn't say, but we talked about the
deed and we talked about the deed and had
the arrangements n1ade in the Recorder's
office.

Q. Now as a matter of fact, you and John didn't
talk about that deed in the car, did you~
~-\..

We might have, we might not, I don't remember.

Q. You are not sure are
A.

you~

Not sur,e no, sir. (Tr. 278-279)

Q. That's right, close by and you could have
said the same thing to him there couldn't
1

you~

A.

Well, I didn't want to disturb the other people. I called him over and we talked by ourselves.

Q. Didn't you want Lawrenee to hear what you
were going to tell him~
A.

He could have heard me.'' ( Tr. 279)

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF R. R. JEWKES BY
MOYNIHAN:

"Q. While you were in the Recorder's office, did
you have occasion to see Lawrence Migliaccio, Frank Davis, and John Davis~
A.

I did.
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Q. What were they

doing~

A.

As I remember, they were asking the Recorder, or Deputy Recorder, regarding some
conveyanee. What conveyance I just don't
know.

Q.

Did you meet them

A.

I was at my ab;stracting table in the Recorder's office when I looked up and saw
the 3 gentlemen at the counter.

Q.

Were any questions asked of you

A.

Yes. John or Frank, I was better acquainted
with Frank, beckoned with a finger and
asked me if I'd help him with a deed.

Q.

Did he say to whom

A.

Not in the Recorder's office, I don't think.

Q.

Was Magliaccio

A.

He was in the room.

Q.

Was John Davis

A.

Yes.

Q.

When he motioned with his finger to you, did
you come over to where he was~

A.

I did, went to the

Q.

And was Migliaccio

A.

He was in the room, but now his exact position in relation to mine and Davis', I don't
feel competent to locate.

Q.

Well, state whether or not they were all-

A.

They were all in the Recorder's office at that
time, the three of them, yes. I have a definite

there~

there~

~

there~

there~

count~er.

there~
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impression that they were.

Q. And where did you g·o'?
A.

"\Y e proceeded upstairs to my off~ce, County
~-\.ttorney

in the adjoining room there.

Q.

"\"\~hat

~-\..

I asked him their business and it was the
desire of John to have a quit-claim deed made
in favor of his brother, Frank, and they asked
m·e if I would help them." (Tr. 214-215)

CROSS
GERI:

did you do there 1

EX~-\.~IINATION

OF JEWKES BY RUG-

"Q. Now, how fare away from Mr. Frank Davis
were you sitting when he summoned you up
close to him 1
A.

Oh, approximately less than, le5s than the
distance between you and me.

Q.

You'd say about

feet~

Q. You were in speaking distance to him right
there weren't
A.

you~

Yes.

Q. He didn't tell you what his business was at
that distance did he~
A.

No, I came over to the counter. (Tr. 219-220)

Q.

Now neither John B. David or Frank Davis
told you who they wanted the deed made to
did they~

A.

Not in the Recorder's office.

Q.

Yes, down in the Recorder's office, and did
they tell you which property it affected in
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the Recorder's

office~

A.

No.

Q.

All of that information wasn't disclosed until
after you were up in the County Attorney's
office~

A.

That is true.

Q.

Now, was Mr. Miglia;ccio in the County Attorney 's office on the '9th when this deed
was being prepared~

A.

I don't recall that he was. I am almost sure
that he was not. He had been in my office
on several occa.sions, but not with Frank and
John on this occasion.

Q.

And he wasn't there on this-

A.

I'd say he was not in my attorney's office on ij
this date." (Tr. 220-221)
(b)

~

LAW

Bas~ed upon the above evidence, the cases cited below
appear to appellant to be applicable. The law of estoppel j
as it applies to this case follows.

Hilton v. Sloan, et .al., 108 Pac. 689 at page 699, the
Court by Justice Frick, states:
''The party invoking the estoppel must show
that at the time he acted upon what appeared to
him to he the real fa;ct, he lacked both the knowledge and the reasonable means of ascertaining
the real fact.s, and that he relied upon the facts
and circumstances as they then appeared to him
in view of the conduct of the party against whom
the estoppel is involked.''
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In the rase of lYellsville East Field I rr. Co., et ~al.
v. Lindsay Larnd & Lit·estock Co., et al., 137 P2 p~ge 634,
Sylibus. it says:
•'The elements requisite for 'estoppel' are
substantially those necessary to found an
action for deceit, with exception of element of
knowledge of falsity.
"An 'e8toppel' involves turpitude or fraud
such as misleading statements or acts, or concealment of facts by silence with result that one party
is induced by words, conduct or silen0e of another
party to do things which he otherwise would not
have done.''

In Re: Evans, 130 Pa,c. 217, ±2 Utah 282, Justice
Straup on page 225 of Pacific ha8 this to say:
'' Estoppel8 are odious, and every presumption is against them until the right to apply them
affirmatively appears with certainty by the right
record.''

Ut. State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Perkins, et al., 173
Pac. 950, 53 Utah 474. In the course of the opinion, the
Court by Justice Gideon, has this to say about estoppel
on facts somewhat the same a8 those of the instant case:
"It was insisted on by respondent that Perkins, one of the appellants was estopped. (The
plaintiff Company is in no position to urge the
ground of estoppel.) All the fact.:; surrounding
the execution of the conveyances were known to
it (respondent), and it cannot, for that reason,
claim that it acted to its injury in ignorance of
the facts.''
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The Idaho Supreme Court, in Little 1/. Bergdahl
Oil Co., 95 P2 433, holds in its opinion at page 838:
''To constitute an estoppel, it must be shown
there was a false representation or concealment
of a material fact; that itwas made with knowledge, either actual or constru'ctive, of the facts;
that the party to whom the false representation
was made was without knowledge or means of
acquiring knowledge of the real facts; that the
false representation was made with the intention
that it should be acted upon and the party to
whom it was made must have relied on or acted
upon it to his prejudice.''
See T~acy Loa;n & Trust Co. v. Op~Cnshaw Investment Co. et al., 132 P2 388, 102 Ut. 509.

Cook v. Cook, 174 P2 434 (Utah).
Batters v. Santa Fe Nat. Life Ins. Co., 138 P2 1019,
47 N. M. 202.
'I

In 21 C. J. 1129-30, we quote:
''Necessity of Lack of Knowledge or of
Means of Knowledge : As a corollary to the proposition that the party setting up an estoppel
must have act~ed in reliance upon the conducts
or representations of the party sought to be
estopped, it is a general rule essential that the
former should not only have been destitut'e of
knowledge of the real facts as to the matter in
controversy, but should have also been without
convenient or ready means of acquiring su.ch
know}edge. One relying on an estoppel must have
exercised such reasonable diligence as the circumstances of the case require. If he conducts
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hin1self with a careless indifference to means of
information reasonably at hand or ignores highly
suspicious circumstances which should warn him
of danger or loso, he ,cannot invoke the doctrine
of estoppel.''

(Utah-Centennial Eureka JI in. Co. v. Juab Cownty,
22 Utah 395, 62 P. 102-!; Brigha.m Young Trust Co. v.
Wagner, 12 Utah 1, 40 P. 764; Poynter v. Chipman, 8
Utah -!-!2, 32 P. 690.)
(19 F. 2d 781; 2-!2 P. 518; 253 P. 137; 257 P. 406) and
other cases cited in the notes.
There are many caseo akin to the foregoing. Here
we refer to but a few, which hold in acord with the general and universal rule that "the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the facts.''

Tomas v. Hellman, 1 P2 31; Maggini v. West Coast
Life Ins. Co., 29 P2 263; California Canning Peach
Gr-owers Ass'n. v. Williams, 69 P2 893; Killian v. Couselko, Supreme Do Unias Portuguees De Estado d. Calif.
"Generally, doctrine of estoppel is not regarded with favor and should be applied only
when all elements constituting an estoppel clearly
appear ... "

Susman v. Exchange Nat. Bank of
183 P. 2d. 57.

Colo~ado

Biprrings,

"The essential el'ements of 'equitable estoppel' are false representation or concealment of
facts; knowledge, actual or con.-;tructive, of the
real facts; the person to whom the representa-
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tion was made must be without knowledge or
means of knowledge of the real facts; representation must have been made with int·ention that it
should be acted upon; and party to whom it was
made must have relied on or acted upon it to
his prejudice.''
J

Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,176 Pac. 912.
Clarkson v.

ran Antwerp, 200 P.

2d 442.

Rosser v. Texas Oil Co., 48 P2 327, 173 Okla. 309.
In Re: Davis esta.te, 101 P2 761.
Mercer Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 108 Pac. 65.

Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. v.
National Finding Co.rp., 114 P2 49.
Farmers Reservo!ir & Irrigation Co. v. Fulton Irri.
Dit'ch
Co., 120 P. 196.
I

g~ation

Fite v. Van Antwerp, 200 P2 439.
(1) NO ESTOPPEL BY SILENCE, UNLESS
THERE IS A DUTY TO SPEAK
The District Court seemingly thought that the ap'"
pellant was under a duty to speak. It isurged that where
the respondent, Frank Davis, had ''actual notice'' under
the statute 78-1-6, Utah Code Ann. 1'943, which has been
quoted above, it was not the duty of appellant to speak,
·even if he knew what J. B. Davis and Frank Davis were
up to when they made the deed. (Exhibit C) The evidence as to whether appellant heard any conversations
between the brothers or that appellant knew anything
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about what the DaYis Brothers were up to is very
meager, unc.ertain, and at n1ost, not a clear statement
by the respondent as to what artually took plac.e. The
evidenre referred to has already been presented. Appellant's denial of any knowledge of what Frank and
John B. Davis were doing is strengthened when we hear
what appellant says to these brothers months later, when
at the mine, appellant says to both Frank Thi. and John B.
Davis at Transcript pages 1-1-5 and 146:
.. You know darn well, you guys, that I have
got a deed and you know it is to that property.''
The testimony of Frank Davis is certainly not clear
as to appellant's participation in the making of the quitclaim deed of August 9, 1948.
The Montana Supreme Court, in the case of She.rlo'ck
v. Greaves, 76 P2 87 at 91, holds:
" ... mere silence cannot work an estoppel.
To be effective for this purpose, the person to be
estopped must have had the intent to mislead or
a willingness that another should be deceived,
and the other must have been misled by the
silence.''
See also: Fitzwater v. Norcross et al., 37 P2 522.
Even if what Frank Davis states were true, appellant did not actually know the deed had been executed
and put on record, for we read: (Tr. pages 101, 102, and
Exhibit 4). This testimony here refered is given below.
If appellant did not in some more definite manner
participate in the ex,ecution of this deed than is indi-
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catd in this testimony, he had no duty in fact, in law, or
in conscience, to speak. Appellant told Frank many times
as appears in the evidence above presented that John
B. Davis had quit-claim'ed' all hi.s interests in these claims
to him. Why in reason or common sense need he now
at the Recorder's office, or should he then tell him
again. Frank Davis had had ample opportunity to
actually see the deed of John B. Davis to appellant.
Such failure to investigate is simply pure neglect and
respondent's position a.s to an estoppel is not worthy
of consideration.
Our Supreme Court in the casre of Utah State Building Commission for the Use amd Benefit of Mountaitn
States Supp~ly Co. v. Gre,at American Indemnity Co., et
al, 140, P. 2, 763, at page 772, says:
"It is generally held in order for silence to
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to
speak, or there must be something wilful or culpable in the silence which allows another to place
himself in an unfavorablre position by reason
thereof.'' (Citing cases.)

From all the evidence, there is grav~e doubt that
appellant had ever heard of the deed of August 9, 1948,
or why should he have stated:
''You know darn well, you guys, that I have
got a deed and you know it i8 to this property."
(Trans. 145-146.)
and if appellant knew, why would John B. Davi.s say:
'' Q.

1
1

And you had a ;conversation though, did you
not, in the Recorder's Office wherein you

re-1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

55
quested Jewkes, while l\1igliaccio was in the
Recorder "s office, if he could make some
papers out for these claims to Frank 1
A.

No, sir.

Q. You didn't say anything to him about making
out a deed down there 1
A.

No, sir, not in front of l\1igliaccio, I didn't.
\V e asked him up in his room.

Q. Well, did you make it down there, not in
front of Migliaccio, did you have any conversation about it down there 1
A.

Not that I remember about, no.

Q. Were you watching Migliaccio every minute 1
A.

No, but he was in the R!e;corder's office and
there was nothing said about them papers
until we got up in Jewkes' room.

Q. Was there any reason why you didn't want
Migliaccio to hear what you were saying that
day~

A.

Yes, I didn't want him to know that I was
doing that.

Q. You came together.
A.

I know it. But he didn't know we was going
to do that though. (Trans. 101-102.)

Q. What is the fact as to whether you and Migliaccio and the Davis' went to the office, law
office of Senior and Senior in Salt Lake the
latter part of June, 1948, for the purpose of
discussing this rna tter ~
A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

You did, didn't

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Migliaccio was

you~

there~.

A. Yes, sir.

Q.

Did he assert any claim to anything else except the Jensen interest at that timeT

A.

There was no claims mentioned at that time.

Q.

Senior & 8enior gave you some advice, didn't
theyT

A.

Yes, sir. That was on fighting this other case
that was coming upT" (Trans. 92.)

If respondent had wanted to parti;cipate in the ownership of the mining claims he could hav'e asked appellant to deed directly to hims·elf, Frank M. Davis. Why
all the secTecy about the deed of August 9th, 1948T Th
only answer that has any sense or reason in it is just
what John B. Davis states:
"We didn't want Lawrence to know about
it." (See Trans. page 101-102.)
The facts in this, our case, will not justify the conclusion that appellant had a duty to speak. Why would
it he appellant's duty to reiterate that which he had so
many times before then, already told Frank. It looks
somewhat as if Frank and John were trying to ''put one
over" on the appellant, in the hope that appellant could
not obtain his deed from Hammond. This inference is
strengthened when we read Mr. Hammond's testimony
and examine Exhibit 4. Mr. Hammond, in 1943~ got

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

57
John B. Davis to execute a quit-claim deed (Exhibit 5)
to Lawrence Migliaccio. This deed decribed Claims that
I
John B. Davis had never located, but Hammond withheld Exhibit 1 in order to force appellant to record a
worthless deed so that Hammond could collect 2lj2 percent from somebody else. B}: examining Exhibits 1 and
5, this idea can be seen clearly.
1

(2) THERE IS NOT ESTOPPEL WHEN PARTIES
ARE NEGLECT
The respondents cannot claim estoppel by virtue
of their own negligence. The respondents, by Frank
Davis' own admissions, had been told several times that
John B. Davis had deeded all his interest in the mining
claims to appellant. He was told by two persons, Mr.
Cooper and Mr. Tomlinson, that the -deed was in J. B.
Hammond's office. (Trans;cript pages 174-175-176 and
182-183-184 and 185.) Frank -Davis spent much time in
Price, within a few steps of where Hammond's office
is located. But he never took interest enough in its
existence to go and see it.
In the case of Gordon v. Pettingrill, et al., 96 P2 416,
the Supreme Court of Colorado states on page 418:
"A litigant will not be heard to say he was
ignorant of the facts which it was to his interest
to know, and which, if awake, he would have
known.''
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Kloppenburg v. Mayse, 88 P2 883, at page 18, says:
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''Equity· will not do for a litigant which he
had the power to do and could have done for himself and declined or neglected to do when the
choice and opportunity was to protect himself."
(Citing other Idaho ,cases.)
At no time after August 9th, 1948, is there any evidence in the record that even hints that appellant looked
upon or dealt with the respondents, as interested owners,
with himself. On the contrary, the evidence strongly
points to the fact that the brothers, J. B. and Frank
Davis were working the claims on the basis of a 50-50
agreement to share the profits made from the sales of
ores by both appellant and respondents; John B. Davis
to receive one-half of what Frank made. (Transcript
pages 128.)

"Q. John wasn't here until you sent for him?
Now, Mr. Davis, if Lawrence wasn't the
owner of that property, why did you go to
him to enter into a contract to go to work?
A.

He and I was just agreeing.

Q.

What were you agreeing

A.

To an operation at the mine. ,.

Q.

All right, so that the only agreement between
you and Lawrence was 13. working agreemtmt
at the mine, isn't that right~

A.

That's right, a working agreement.

Q.

You were never to get any title from Lawrence or from John, isn't that right~

A.

No, my agreement was to furnish money to
start the mine on a paying basis.

1

to~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59
Q.

That's right and you ·were to get 50% of the
profits, isn't that right J?

~-\.

Fifty percent of the profits until John arrived
and then it \n1s split 3 ways.

Q.

~-\Jl

right that means, or rather the agreement
was that the ore shipments and the money
therefrom would be split 3 ways 1

~-\.

That's right. (Tr. 276-277)

Q. And with that lmderstanding you agreed to
put up all the money and still only take back
a fifty-fifty profit, is that right 1
A.

Take back fifty-fifty of the profits and then
one third of the profits. After October, we
went one-third, before October, Lawre~ce and
I went fifty-fifty.

Q. .And you said on direct examination they
made a proposition wherein you wer to furnish all the money, is that right~
A.

Until the property was paid for.'' (Tr. 274)

A fuller account of this sharing has been given
above. Let us here remind this court that" after October
we went one-third". vVhy one-third if appellant only
owned one-fourth 1 But up to October it was 50-50. This
was after the deed of August 9, 1948.

3.

THE LAW GENERALLY

Our Supreme Court in many cases has laid down
the elements of estoppel, but we present here, the case
of Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P2 731, and a few other
authorities which have this to say:
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"It is elementary that as a matter of pleading an estoppel in pais exists only when facts
are alleged which show that one person has by
his words, deeds, or conduct so behaved that
another person in good faith relying upon such
conduct has been intentionally led thereby 'to
change his position for the worse and who would
not have so changed his position except for the
conduct of the other party....

"In order to constitute this kind of estoppel
there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts; it must have been made
with knowledge, actual or constructive of the
facts; the party to whom 'it was made must have
bee.n without knowledge or the mearn.s of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made
with the intention that it should be acted upon;
and the party to whom it was made must have
relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice. To
constitute an 'estoppe lin pais' there must' concur
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with
the claim afterward asserted, action by the other
party thereon and injury to such other party.
There can be no estoppel if either of these elements are wanting. They are each of equal importance.''
21 Corpus Juris, pp. 1119, 1120; see also, Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) P. 1644; Bigelow on
Estoppel (6th Ed.) pp. 603-604....
"It is an essential element of estoppel in
pais that the person involving it relied upon the
representation or conduct of the other party, was
influenced in his own conduct by it, and would
not have ajcted as he did but for the acts of which
he now complains. If complainant's act appears
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to be the result of his own will of judgment, if it
doea not appear to be the proximate result of
the conduct or representations of the adverse
party. there is no estoppel. The conduct must of
itself have been sufficient to warrant or induce
the course of conduct by the party seeking to
invoke estoppel and it must have been made for
the purpose of inducing auch response and action
by the complainant."
In harmony with many other casea including our
Utah cases, the California Supreme Court holds in
Illoss v. Underwr1iters Report, Inc., 83 P2 03, quoting
from page 507 :
''The evidence fails to show the essential
elements of an estoppel. One relying on a plea
of estoppel must have been ignorant" of the true
state of the facts and must have been intentionally
misled by the a:ct of the other to his injury."
(citing cases)
The respondent in this case suffered no injury, loss
or prejudice. Frank Davis worked the claims for over
three montha, and respondents' Exhibit '' F '' shows that
he sold, during this time, over $14,000:00 worth of ore,
for which he was paid in cash by the purchaser. He
purchased from the money he received from the sale of
ores, a $2,200.00 compressor and over $1,000.00 worth
of other equipment, which he now is employing in his
operation on these claims. Respondenta are at least better off now than they were on August 9th, 1948 by over
$3,000.00. (Tr. 255-256)

Tuff v. Bagley, et

~al.,

276 Pac. 912:
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''One of the essential elements which must
enter into and form a part of an equitable estoppel is that the truth concerning the fajcts relied
upon by the person claiming the benefit of the
estoppel was unknown. A person may not avail
himself of this conduct, act, language, or silence
of another under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, unless such person has been misled thereby.''
(Also 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. 4th Ed., :S. 805.)

Utah State Bld,g. & Lo·an Ass'n.
173 P. 950, has this to say:

L

Pe.rkims et al.,

"In order to constitute an estoppel, there
must be a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts; it must have been made with
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts;
the party to whom it was made, must have been
without knowledge of the real facts; it must have
been made with the intention that it should be
~cted upon; and that the party to whom it was
made must have acted upon it to his prejudice."
The waiver Hy appellant that the Court finds of an
accounting on appellant's Third Cause of Action was
not a general waiver. It was merely a waiver of an accounting as to appellant's Third Cause of Action, a
statutory cause of action for trespass. This could not,
at the time it was waived, have been a general waiver
as at that stage in the trial, there had been nothing appear in the evidence that would indicate that the court
would find that the appellant and respondents would be
found to be tenants in common-not even the respondents had thought so as they proceeded to make an accounting and would have ;continued doing so had their
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evidence not been objectionable on the grounds of not
fulfilling the law and rules of evidence governing such
an accounting. The idea appellant had in this early
waiver is illustrated in the case of Lillywhite, et al v.
Coleman, et al., 52 P2 1157, an Arizona case. It would
appear by this ruling that respondents in the present and
instant case waived appellant's waiver as a matter of
law, for respondent does not take this waiver seriously
as they proceed to render an accounting.
Attention is called to the waiver of appellant, in
which he does not require the respondents to amend their
answer, pleading estoppel. The Court will notice that
this waiver occurred at that stage in the trial to only that
evidence relating to the presence or absence of appellant, in Senior'~ law office in Salt Lake City, and it did
not extend to the necessity of pleading an estoppel in
the relation to the evidence pertaining to the quit-claim
deed of August 9, 1948.

Laske v. Lampasoria, 200 P2 826.
''The burden rests wholly upon the respondents to prove their estoppel.''

Ga.rrett v. Cook, 200 P2 21.
''Burden rests upon one who relies upon
equitable estoppel as a defense to an action to
quiet title to satisfactorily prove all necessary elements of his alleged claim in that regard.''
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

64
RESPONDENT, FRANK DAVIS TO ACCOUNT FOR
HIS ORE SALES DURING THE OCCUPATION OF
THE PROPERTY BEFORE THE RESTRAINING
ORDER WAS iSSUED AND SERVED.
If, as the lower Court holds, the appellant and respondents were tenants in common, then the duty of
each tenant is to account to the other for ores, removed
and sold, on their separate operations. If these parties
are tenants in common, then the lower court ·erred by not
allowing full accounting and equal set-offs. The Court's
decision would be and is in the nature of penalty which
is Certainly not warranted by the evidence.
1

Should this Court uphold the Lower Court on its
theory of tenants in common, then app~llant is entitled
to 10/16 interest in the equipment or its value, as it is
listed and priced on pages 255 and 256 of the Transcript. Appellant is also entitled on this theory, to a
full accounting from the respondents from October 1,
1948, up and including April13, 1949, the date Frank M.
Davis left the property. (Tr. 114) Not having made
proper findings on these matters were errors on the
part of the Lower Court.
We deem it only necessary to call the Court's attention to this matter as the law is so universal in its application, we feel, as did the attorneys for the respondents in their Lower Court brief, that the article on
"Tenancy in Common' in 62 Corpus Juris, beginning at
page 401, and especially the following quotations taken
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from this brief and from that article are particularly
applicable, to-wit:
•· :JriXES AND :MINERALS. · Two or more
persons owning undivided intere~ts in mining
ground are tenants in common.''
62 C. J., page -!21, S. 26.
"Each tenant in ,common is equally entitled
to the use, benefit, and possession of the common
property, and may exercise acts of ownership in
regard thereto.''
62 C. J., page 421, S. 26.
''MINES AND :MINERALS. In accordance
with the general rules relative to the use and enjoyment of the common property, tenants in
common in mines and minerals are equally entitled to the use and enjoyment of the common
property. One tenant in common may occupy and
operate the common property, and is bound to
care for it as if it were his own. He cannot exclude his co-tenant from exer,cising the same
rights, and he cannot, by developing the property,
obliterate the interest of his co-tenant."
62 C. J., page 422, S. 27.
''RENTS AND PROFITS RECEIVED ...
the rule may now be stated in general terms to
be that the co-tenant receiving more than his just
share of the rents and profits as to the common
property may be required to account to his cotenants in proportion to their respective shares
for the excess received by him.''
62 C. J ., page 448, S. 65.
''Proceeds or profits diminishing corpus of
estate. A co-tenant is liable to account for pro-
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fits produ,ced by his own efforts if such income
is realized through a diminution of the corpus
of the estate, as by quarrying, removing minerals
or oil, or carrying away timber."
62 C. J., page 450, S. 65.
''MINING ... And the tenant in common taking the mineral cannot keep the proceeds of a
sale thereof without accounting, on the theory that
the portion of land furnishing the coal is no more
than his just due.''
62 C. J., page 455, S. 73.
As will be seen from the foregoing general principles, the Lower Court erred in its Finds of Fact, Conclusions and Decree, even on the Court's theory of the
case. (Judgment Roll pages 12-22 and 23-28.) It wholly
overlooked this important matter and should be reversed
on this alone, as the Court made no findings covering
this or did the court render any judgment covering the
division of their money.
ASSINGMENT OF ERROR NO. 7
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING THE RESPECTIVE INTERESTS OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS IN THE MINING
EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY APPELLANT AND
RESPONDENTS AND EMPLOYED IN THEIR MINING OPERATIONS OF THESE CLAIMS.
According to the testimony of Frank M. Davis, the
appellant owns at least a ONE-THIRD (1/3) INTEREST in a dump Car, a mule and horse worth $150.00; a
1
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compressor worth $2,264.00; a jackhammer valued at
$255.00; and 215' of hose valued at $75.35; 240' of pipe
valued at $56.00. Thi.s property totals $2,975.35. (Tr.
pages 253-25±.)
That the appellant has this interest is stated definitely by Frank ~I. Davis as follows :

''Q.

Now is all that equipment paid

for~

A.

No. sir.

Q.

How much of it is paid

A.

A little left on the Compressor.

Q.

Is the rest of it all paid

A.

Yes.

Q.

So that you own that, is that

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

That equipment belonged, half of it to Mr.
Migliaccio under the contract~

A.

When it is paid for, his interest is in it, sure
it is." (Tr. 288-289)

for~

for~

right~

The Court ignored in its Findings, Conclusions of
Law and Decree, this matter. Appellant considers this
an important as well as reversible error. But on the
basis of the Court's Judgment, appellant should have
been found to own not less than 10/16 of this property,
but the Lower Court does nothing about it.
Appellant urges that this error is sufficient to require a reversal of the Lower Court's Judgment.
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THEREFORE : The appellant respectfully submits
that the Judgment of the District Court should be reversed, vacated and set aside, and that this Court give
judgment for the appellant, granting sole ownership to
him of the seven ( 7) mining claims as described in respondents' Answer, together with costs of appeal and
costs in the Lower Court.

Attorney for Appellant
Copy of the foregoing brief is re:ceived on this ___________ _
)

day of ----·--------------------------------------------------------, 1949.

Attorneys for Respondents

State of Utah
County of Salt Lake

)
) ss.
)

K. K. Steffensen, being duly sworn says that he is
an Attorney at Law and is the Attorney of Record for
the above named Appellant in the above entitled cause,
and that his office is in 414 Felt Bldg., Salt Lake City, in
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. That Luke G.
Pappas and Moynihan-Hughes-Sherman are the Attor-
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neys of Record for the above named Respondents in said
cause and that they, the said Attorneys reside:
Luke G. Pappas-Price, Carbon County, State of Utah.
Moynihan..:Hughes-Sherman-Montrose, Colorado.'
That in each of the said places, there is a United
States Post Office and between said place.s and Salt Lake
City, there is a regular daily communication by mail;
that on the------------ day of November, 1949, Affiant served
two (2) true copies off Appellant's Brief in the above
entitled case on the said Luke G. Pappas and MoynihanHughes-Sherman, the Attorneys of Record for the Respondents, by depositing copies of ·.said Appellant's Brief
on said date, in the Post Office at Salt Lake City, in the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, properly enclosed
in a sealed envelope, addressed to each of said Attorneys
and at their respective addresses given above and prepaying the po.stage thereon.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ------------ day
of November, 1949.

NOTARY PUBLIC, RESIDING AT
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

My .commission expires --------------------------------------------------·
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